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Involuntary guardianship' is the legal mechanism by which a
state shields those individuals who are mentally incapable of manag-
ing their personal or financial affairs from their own improvidence.'
Guardianship benefits those who are unable to conduct their own
affairs by providing that which incompetents are unable to provide:
responsible decision making that protects the ward and his estate
from personal or financial ruin.' To accomplish this, the state denies
I. There are five types of guardianship in Pennsylvania: (1) the "natural" guardianship
of one who maintains a minor, usually a parent, relative or institution, 20 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 5101, 5102 (Purdon 1975); (2) the "guardian ad litem" appointed by the court to
represent the interests of the minor or incompetent in specific litigation, 20 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. RULES 2027, 2028, 2053 (Purdon 1975); (3) guardianship of an incompetent's person, 20
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5501, 5511 (Purdon 1975); (4) guardianship of an incompetent's
estate, 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5501, 5511 (Purdon 1975); and (5) the institutional "guard-
ian officer" of incompetent patients of state mental hospitals, created by the decisions in Vec-
chione v. Wohlgemuth, 80 F.R.D. 32 (E.D. Pa. 1978), and Vecchione v. Wolhgemuth, 377 F.
Supp. 1361 (E.D. Pa. 1974). The scope of this comment includes only those guardians of the
person and estate appointed pursuant to 20 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 5501 (Purdon 1975). Be-
cause the appointment of "guardian officers" are subject to these provisions, they may also be
considered to be within the purview of this comment. Guardianship must be distinguished,
however, from civil commitment proceedings such as those initiated under the Mental Health
Procedures Act of 1976, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7101-7503 (Purdon Supp. 1978), which per-
mits the involuntary institutionalization of a "severely mentally disabled" individual. See gen-
erally Belsky, Pennsylvania's New Mental Health Law, 48 PA. B.A.Q. 482 (1977); Note,
Standards/or Involuntary Commitment in Pennsylvania, 38 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 535 (1977).
2. Pennsylvania guardianship law contains provisions for the protection of both the per-
son and the estate of an individual who is adjudged incompetent. The law, however, distin-
guishes between the two by impliedly requiring the petitioner to meet different standards
depending on the type of guardianship sought. The statute states that the "court, upon petition
and a hearing at which good cause is shown, may find a person domiciled in the Common-
wealth to be incompetent and appoint a guardian or guardians of his person or estate." 20 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5511 (Purdon 1975). An incompetent is defined as "a person who because
of infirmities of old age, mental illness, mental deficiency or retardation, drug addiction or
inebriety:
(I) is unable to manage his property, or is liable to dissipate it or become the victim of
designing persons; or
(2) lacks sufficient capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions concerning his
person. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5501 (Purdon 1975).
For an indepth analysis of the standard see Comment, An Assessment of the Pennsylvania
Estate Guardianship Incompetency Standard, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1048 (1976). See generally
Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 774 (1966).
3. The benefits of guardianship have been described as "preventive and protective" and
in the ward's "best interests." See, e.g., Nagle Estate, 418 Pa. 170, 172, 210 A.2d 262, 264
the incompetent the capacity to effect his legal relationships4 and
places the management of his affairs in the hands of an appointed
guardian.5 Notwithstanding the benevolent purposes of guardian-
ship, the effect of this substitute decision making is not only the dep-
rivation of many of the ward's important property rights6 but also
serious infringement of his personal liberties.7
As a function of the parens patriae power,8 the imposition of
guardianship is justified only when it is in the proposed ward's best
interest.9 In Pennsylvania lax substantive and procedural standards
combine to create a high risk that guardianship will be erroneously
imposed, 0 a result that is clearly not in the proposed ward's best
(1965): Earnshaw Appeal, 187 Pa. Super. Ct. 124, 129, 144 A.2d 480, 482 (1958) Sigel Estate,
169 Pa. Super. Ct. 425, 429, 82 A.2d 309, 311 (1951). But cf. Meyers Estate, 395 Pa. 459, 462,
150 A.2d 525, 526 (1959) ("a dangerous statute easily capable of abuse"); Ryman's Case, 139
Pa. Super. Ct. 212, 223, 11 A.2d 677, 683 (1940) (statute a "dangerous one, to be administered
with great caution").
4. In Pennsylvania the legal disabilities resulting from an adjudication of incompetency
ensue from 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5524 (Purdon 1975), which states that "[a]n incompe-
tent shall be incapable of making any contract or gift or any instrument in writing .... " See
notes 64-69 and accompanying text infra. For a listing of the legal disabilities that result from
an adjudication of incompetency in other states see AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MEN-
TALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW, 303-40, Tables 9.1-9.4 (rev. ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
A.B.F. STUDY]. See generally Weihofen, Mental Incompetencg to Contract or Convey 39 S.
CAL. L. REV. 211 (1966).
5. Although appointment of a guardian is within the court's discretion even after a find-
ing of incompetency, no cases have been found in which the court was willing to strip an
individual of his legal capacity to conduct his affairs without also appointing a surrogate man-
ager. Generally, any person or corporation may be appointed guardian of an incompetent,
though most frequently the petitioner seeks and gains appointment. See R. ALLEN, E. FER-
STER & H. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 90 (1968) [hereinaf-
ter cited as ALLEN]. For the specific listing of the powers, duties, and liabilities of guardians in
Pennsylvania see 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5521-5522 (Purdon 1975). The guardians duties
may be generally described as fiduciary but the specific powers of a guardian are, theoretically
at least, subject to the appointing court's supervision.
6. See notes 64-69 and accompanying text infra.
7. See notes 77-84 and accompanying text infra.
8. The parenspatriae power is an outgrowth of the English notion that the King was the
"father of the country." De Praerogative Regis. 17 Edw. § 2, c. 9 ( 1324), charged the King with
guardianship of mental deficients. In the United States, as society recognized the injustice of
treating mentally deficient individuals as criminals, the parenspatriae power became the justi-
fication for intervening in the lives of those who posed no threat to society. Use of the parens
patriae power must be for the best interests of the individual. This contrasts with use of the
police power, which is for the protection, health, and safety of society as a whole. See N.
KITTRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT: DEVIANCE AND ENFORCED THERAPY 59 (1971) [here-
inafter cited as KITTRIE]; A. MITCHELL, THE OBJECTS OF OUR WISDOM AND COERCION: IN-
VOLUNTARY GUARDIANSHIP FOR INCOMPETENTS 6 (1978) [hereinafter cited as MITCHELL].
The Supreme Court has described the use of the parenspatriae power as a "parental" rather
than an "adversary" action. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966). But eI, n re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967) (meaning of the phrase parenspatriae is "murky").
9. The "best interests doctrine" has often been invoked to dispel the concerns with lib-
erty and property deprivations that accompany guardianship. The doctrine has been the sub-
ject of sharp criticism, having been characterized as a "mythical talisman." See Comment, The
Disguised Oppression of Involuntary Guardisnshi.p: Have the Elderly Freedom to Speak?, 73
YALE L.J. 676, 684 (1964).
10. See notes 92-95 and accompanying text infra. For the purposes of this comment, the
imposition of guardianship is "erroneous" when, in determining a proposed ward's compe-
tence, a court errs in its findings of law, findings of fact, or application of law to fact.
The guardianship law in Pennsylvania is in serious need of overall revision. Legislation
interest. The most glaring defect is the failure to provide for repre-
sentation of the alleged incompetent's interests.'' Although Penn-
sylvania recognizes the right of an alleged incompetent to retain
counsel to represent him at the hearing,' 2 in practice the proposed
ward is rarely represented.' 3 Moreover, the proceedings are frequen-
tly exparte. '4 This lack of representation increases the risk that un-
necessary guardianship will be imposed upon the alleged
incompetent.
The procedural safeguards due alleged incompetents have
rarely been the subject of litigation.'5 The nature of guardianship
has been introduced in both the Senate and House of Representatives that would greatly re-
duce the risk of an erroneous imposition of guardianship. See Session of 1979 S. 782, Printers
No. 848, introduced _, referred to Committee on Judiciary May 30, 1979; Session of 1979
H.R. 1578, Printer's No. 1888, introduced June 28, 1979, referred to Committee on Judiciary
June 29, 1979. Similar legislation was also introduced in 1978 but was defeated.
Pennsylvania is by no means unique in possessing an inadequate guardianship statute.
The serious defects in the guardianship laws of many states prompted the formulation of a
comprehensive state guardianship statute by the American Bar Association. See 3 MENTAL
DISABILITY REP. 264 (1979).
II. Although Pennsylvania permits representation by counsel, see note 12 and accompa-
nying text infra, the legislature has specifically provided that "lilt shall not be necessary for the
alleged incompetent to be represented by a guardian ad litem in the proceeding." 20 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 551 1(a)(ii) (Purdon 1975).
12. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5511(a) (Purdon 1975). It is interesting to note that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recently created a single exception to the rule that represen-
tation of the alleged incompetent is merely permissive. In In re: Representation of Alleged
Incompetents by Counsel, No. 2, Alleged Incompetents Special Masters Docket (filed April 5,
1979), the court held that alleged incompetents residing in state mental health facilities must be
represented by counsel when the petition for incompetency was necessitated by the decisions of
the District Court in Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 80 F.R.D. 32 (E.D. Pa. 1978), and Vecchione
v. Wohlgemuth, 377 F. Supp. 1361 (E.D. Pa. 1974). The Vecchione decisions found that pa-
tients in state mental facilities must be formally adjudicated incompetent and an institutional
"guardian officer" appointed before the state may effectively appropriate the patient's social
welfare benefits.
13. "In practice the alleged incompetent is almost never represented by counsel or guard-
ian ad litem at the hearing . . . the 'hearing' most often consists of a one sided conference
between the judge, the petitioner, and the petitioner's lawyer in which the interests of the
alleged incompetents go entirely without representation." Horstman, Protective Servicesfor the
Elderly: The Limits of Parens Patriae, 40 Mo. L. REV. 215, 245 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
HORSTMAN]. One study, covering over 600 cases in a six year period, indicated that the pro-
posed incompetent was represented in only .1% of the adjudications. G. ALEXANDER & T.
LEWIN, THE AGED AND THE NEED FOR SURROGATE MANAGEMENT 1-5 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as ALEXANDER & LEWIN]. Pennsylvania is not alone in its failure to provide representa-
tion. Those states that specifically deal with the issue either leave appointment of representa-
tion to the discretion of the judge, see, e.g., IND. CODE § 29-1-18-14 (Supp. 1976); N.J. CIv.
PRAC. RULE 4:83-4(a); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.88.045 (Supp. 1976); Wyo. STAT. § 3-
29.5(b) (1965); or limit the role of the representative specifically to that of guardian ad I/tem.
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.105 (1973); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 14-5303(B) (1974); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 15-14-303(2) (1973); IDAHO CODE § 15-5-303(b) (1971); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18,
§ 3643 (1973); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 91A-5-303 (1975); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2619(b)
(1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-303(B) (Supp. 1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-28-03 (1976);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-1010 (1955); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-5-303(2) (Supp. 1977); VA. CODE
§ 37-1-128.1(A) (1976). Moreover, studies indicate that the guardian adlitem, as an officer of
the court, does not afford adequate representation of the alleged incompetent's interests. See,
e.g., Gupta, New York's Mental Health Information Service: An Experiment in Due Process, 25
RUTGERS L. REV. 405 (1971).
14. See generally ALLEN, supra note 5, at 83.
15. In one recent case deciding the issue of alleged incompetent's due process rights the
proceedings suggests, however, that court appointment of counsel
may be constitutionally required to protect an alleged incompetent's
otherwise unrepresented interests from the high risk of erroneous
deprivation. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
dictates that the procedures by which a state deprives an individual
of certain property and liberty interests must be fundamentally
fair.' 6 Incompetency proceedings at which the alleged incompetent's
significant interests are not represented may violate these due proc-
ess requirements. Because the ability of the proposed ward to make
responsible decisions concerning the protection of his interests is the
very issue of a guardianship proceeding, significant questions arise
when the alleged incompetent is not represented by counsel.
This comment suggests that mandatory court appointment of
counsel' 7 is necessary in order to satisfy the requirements of due
process in Pennsylvania guardianship proceedings. The discussion
will focus on the factors that must be balanced in order to determine
the level of process due, including: (1) the interests at stake for the
alleged incompetent; (2) the substantive and procedural standards of
Pennsylvania guardianship laws as a factor in increasing the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of the alleged incompetent's interests, and
the value of mandatory appointment of counsel in reducing that risk;
and (3) the interest of the government in proceeding without
mandatory appointment of counsel. Finally, the factors will be bal-
anced and the requirements of due process determined.
II. Right to Appointed Counsel as a Function of Procedural Due
Process
Mandatory appointment of counsel was originally based on the
sixth amendment dictate that representation by counsel is essential
to a fair trial 8 for the criminal defendant faced with the possibility
of incarceration. When the criminal defendant is unable to afford
counsel the court must appoint and the state must bear the expense
Seventh Circuit rejected the appellant's contention that the Illinois guardianship statute vio-
lated due process. Rud v. Dahl, 578 F.2d 674 (7th Cir. 1978).
Recently, the guardianship procedures of the District of Columbia have been challenged
in a major class action suit. Justice v. Superior Court of the District of Columbia. No. 79-1524
(D.D.C., filed June 13, 1979). The complaint alleges, inter alia, that the statute requires a
hearing but does not require the basic elements of procedural due process such as representa-
tion by counsel.
16. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358; In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
17. For the purposes of this comment "mandatory appointment of counsel" means the
required appointment by the court of an attorney to act as an advocate for the interests of the
alleged incompetent. This requirement should only be excused when the alleged incompetent
has already retained counsel or makes a knowing and intelligent waiver.
18. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932); see also Comment, Right to Counsel:
The Impact of Gideon v. Wainwright in the Fifty States, 3 CREIGHTON L. REV. 103 (1969). The
sixth amendment states, in pertinent part, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to have the assistance of counsel for his defense."
of counsel to represent the defendant's interests 9 unless he effects a
knowing and intelligent waiver of this right.2" Thus, the sixth
amendment does not permit the defendant's indigency to negate his
right to representation.
Although its origins are in the sixth amendment, the right to
appointed counsel has also been held to be a function of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In In re Gault2' a juve-
nile's liberty was threatened by delinquency proceedings. Because
the delinquency action was not "criminal" in nature,22 the guaran-
tees of the sixth amendment were not applicable. Nevertheless, the
Court looked beyond the "civil label of convenience" to hold that
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires that the
juvenile be accorded the right of representation by counsel.23 To ef-
fectively accord the child this right the state must not only notify the
child and his parents of the child's right to be represented by counsel
retained by them, but must also provide counsel to represent the
child if the parents are unable to afford the expense. 4
In Heryford v. Parker25 the right to appointed counsel was ex-
tended to civil commitment proceedings. The court recognized that
even though the state acts for the benefit of the proposed patient, it
nevertheless has "the inescapable duty to vouchsafe due process, and
this necessarily includes the duty to see that a subject of an involun-
tary commitment proceedings [sic] is afforded the opportunity to the
guiding hand of legal counsel at every step of the proceedings
. . "6 Therefore, in both juvenile and civil commitment proceed-
ings, when indigency threatens to negate the right to representation,
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires the
state to remove the threat by providing representation.27
The due process clause prohibits a state from depriving a person
of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."28 This
See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963).
20. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
21. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
22. The sixth amendment is specifically limited to "'criminal proceedings."
23. In re Gault, 387 U.S. I, 36 (1967). In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), the
Supreme Court reiterated that in a juvenile delinquency proceeding "civil labels and good
intentions do not themselves obviate the need for criminal due process safeguards... ." 1d
at 365-66. The civil-criminal distinction also has been held inapplicable to civil commitment
proceedings. See Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968); see also In re Ballay, 482
F.2d 648, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
24. In re Gault, 307 U.S. 1, 41 (1967).
25. 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968).
26. Id at 396.
27. Note that in both Gauli and Her ford the mandatory appointment of counsel was
triggered by the defendants' indigence. In guardianship proceedings, however, the right to
representation is not threatened by the alleged incompetent's indigency, but by the possibility
that he may not appreciate or even be aware of the need for such representation.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
guaranty requires that both substantive and procedural safeguards
protect constitutionally recognized interests from arbitrary depriva-
tion by the state. Substantive due process requires that state laws
that infringe on protected interests be either rationally related to a
legitimate state goal or justified by a compelling state interest, de-
pending on the nature of the interest involved.29 Procedural due
process, on the other hand, dictates that the procedures by which a
state deprives an individual of protected interests be fundamentally
fair.3" Specifically, procedural due process demands that before state
action may infringe upon an individual's constitutionally recognized
interests that individual must be afforded notice of the action and an
opportunity to be heard.3'
The Supreme Court has developed a two step approach to de-
termine the requirements of procedural due process in a specific con-
text. The first step of the analysis is to determine whether the private
interests at stake are protected. If the threatened interests fall within
the "liberty", or "property" language of the fourteenth amendment,
then they are constitutionally protected and some measure of process
is due.32 Interests that are merely "important" to the individual do
not necessitate due process safeguards.33 If a "protected" interest is
involved the second step of the analysis is employed to determine the
level of procedural protection that is due.34 No formula has been
established for determining what procedures are adequate in a given
context. The concept of due process is flexible, and its requirements
vary according to the significance of the endangered interests.35
29. See generaly Bice, Standards of Judicial Review Under the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 689 (1977); Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "'Property'" 62
CORNELL L. REV. 405 (1977).
When a state law is based on a suspect classification, such as race, alienage, or legitimacy,
or infringes on a fundamental interest, such as marital privacy, substantive due process re-
quires that the courts employ a strict scrutiny test to determine whether the law is based on a
compelling state interest. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). If the law infringes on an interest that is merely "protected"
the law must be merely rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. See, e.g.,Williamson v.
Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
30. See note 16 supra.
31. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). "An ele-
mentary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be given
finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances to appraise interested par-
ties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections."
Id at 314. See also Gannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914).
32. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565
(1975); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972); Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). See generally Comment, Probate Code Con-
servatorships." A Legislative Grant o/New Procedural Protections, 8 PAC. L.J. 73 (1977); Com-
ment, Constitutional Deficiencies in Oklahoma Guardianship Law, 13 TULSA L. REV. 579 (1978).
33. See, e.g., Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
34. For an analysis of what interests may be considered within the purview of the four-
teenth amendment, see notes 39-44 and accompanying text infra.
35. "The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures univer-
sally applicable to every imaginable situation." Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886,
895 (1961).
Thus, the requisites of procedural due process must be determined
on a case-by-case basis. To facilitate this determination the Supreme
Court has fashioned a test by which the private interests that are
threatened with deprivation are balanced against the interest of the
government in a summary proceeding.36 Thus, as the severity of the
threatened deprivation increases in degree, the level of procedural
safeguards must increase proportionately.37
III. The Applicability of Due Process to Guardianship
Proceedings
Examination of the right to appointed counsel in guardianship
proceedings must begin by establishing the applicability of due proc-
ess. If the interests at stake for the alleged incompetent are cogniza-
ble as either "property" or "liberty" interests under the fourteenth
amendment, then some measure of process is constitutionally due.38
The applicability of the fourteenth amendment depends on the
"nature" and not the "weight" of the threatened interests.39 The
gravity of the deprivation is irrelevant at this point in the analysis.4 °
Although the Supreme Court has resisted formal definition ' of "lib-
erty", and "property," it has given some indications of the nature of
the interests that may come within the ambit of those terms.
The Court has held that the meaning of the term "property"
includes not only the actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or
money,4 ' but also encompasses a "broad range of interests that are
secured by existing rules or understandings. ' 42 In Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp.43 for instance, a worker's wages were threatened by
garnishment proceedings. The Court found that the worker's inter-
est in not having the availability of his wages even temporarily sus-
pended was enough of a "property" interest to invoke due process
requirements." In Pennsylvania an adjudged incompetent may be
permanently deprived of the possession and control of all of his real
36. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); notes 53-56 and accompanying text
infra.
37. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (due process requires that a student be
given opportunity to present his version of altercation prior to suspension from high school); In
re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (due process requires indigent child be provided court appointed
counsel in juvenile delinquency proceeding).
38. See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
39. Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
40. The weight of the deprivation is crucial to the analysis, however, should the due
process clause be found applicable. See note 57 and accompanying text infra.
41. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972).
42. Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972). The right "to acquire, enjoy, own and
dispose of property . . .[is] an essential pre-condition to the realization of other basic civil
rights and liberties." Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 545 (1972).
43. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
44. Id.
and personal assets.45 Because the proposed ward may lose the
availability of all of his real and personal property, not merely his
wages, the interests of a proposed ward clearly fall within the mean-
ing of property for fourteenth amendment purposes.
"Liberty" under the fourteenth amendment
denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the
right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, to es-
tablish a home and bring up children, to worship God according
to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the or-
derly pursuit of happiness by free men.4 6
In Goss v. Lopez4 7 the Supreme Court found that the possible
damage to a student's reputation from a one day suspension from
high school was a sufficient threat to the student's liberty interest to
trigger fourteenth amendment requirements. Under Pennsylvania
law, the damage to an individual's reputation resulting from an ad-
judication of incompetency is significantly more serious.48 More-
over, an incompetent may suffer deprivations more directly related
to the traditional concept of liberty. Because an incompetent is le-
gally "incapable" of creating or modifying any contractual rela-
tions,49 his ability "to engage in any of the common occupations of
life"5 in an increasingly commercial society is significantly im-
paired. In addition, because the residence of an incompetent may be
changed at his guardian's discretion,5 the ward may be deprived of
a most obvious "liberty," the "freedom from bodily restraint. 5 2
Thus, the interests at stake for the alleged incompetent in a guardi-
anship proceeding are clearly cognizable as both "property" and
"liberty" interests.
IV. The Level of Process Due: Identifying the Factors
"Once it is determined that due process applies, the question
remains what process is due."53 This determination is accomplished
through balancing and appropriate accommodation of the compet-
45. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5521(l) (Purdon 1975) incorporates 20 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 5141 (Purdon 1975), which provides that the "guardian of the estate... shall have the
right to and shall take possession of, maintain and administer each real and personal asset of
the [incompetent]."
46. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399 (1922)).
47. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
48. See note 89 and accompanying text infra. See generally Section IV, A infra.
49. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5524 (Purdon 1975) states, "An incompetent shall be
incapable of making any contract ...."
50. See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
51. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5536(b)(10) (Purdon 1975).
52. See note 46 and accompanying text supra. See also notes 80-84 and accompanying
text infra.
53. Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
ing interests involved.54 In Mathews P. Eldridge55 the Supreme
Court enumerated the elements upon which the inquiry should fo-
cus.
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of [procedural] due process
generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the
private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of the additional
or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and admin-
istrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural re-
quirement would entail.
56
Thus, according to the Mathews formula, in determining whether
appointed counsel is constitutionally required in Pennsylvania
guardianship proceedings, the examination must consider (1) the in-
terests at stake for an alleged incompetent; (2) the risk that these
interests will be erroneously deprived through the use of the current
guardianship procedures, and the probable value of appointed coun-
sel in reducing that risk; and (3) the interest of the state in con-
ducting guardianship proceedings without appointing counsel.
A. Interests of Alleged Incomfpetents in Guardianshop Proceedings
The key factor in analyzing the private interests under the bal-
ancing test is the degree of the potential deprivation.5" No strict rule
has been enunciated, however, for determining the weight to be ac-
corded various deprivations. Ultimately the private interests must
be examined and weighed on a case-by-case basis.58
Guardianship proceedings consist of two separate steps. First,
upon a showing of "good cause," the court finds the proposed ward
to be "incompetent. ' 59 Second, the court appoints a guardian of the
incompetent's estate or person.6° Although the specific powers and
54. See notes 34-37 and accompanying text supra.
55. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
56. Id at 336.
57. "[Tjhe degree of potential deprivation that may be created by a particular decision is
a factor to be considered in assessing the validity of any . . . decision making process." Id at
342; see Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970). In Goldberg the court found that due process required an evidentiary hearing prior to
termination of welfare benefits. The presumed need of the welfare recipient for the benefits
was the decisive factor. "The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded . . . is
influenced by the extent to which he may be 'condemned to suffer grievious loss.' " Id. at 262-
63 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951)).
58. See notes 32 and 37 supra.
59. "Incompetent" is defined by 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5501 (Purdon 1975). See
note 101 infra.
60. In Pennsylvania, jurisdiction over guardianship proceedings is granted to the Or-
phans' Courts Division of the Court of Common Pleas. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 711(10)
(Purdon 1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 95 1(c) (Purdon 1976). Although 20 PA. CoNs. STAT.
ANN. § 551 l(a) (Purdon 1975) permits appointment of a guardian of the person or estate, see
note 5 and accompanying text supra, and impliedly distinguishes the standard between the two,
see note 2 supra, the statute does not require that the decree appointing the guardian specify
duties of a guardian of the estate may vary from those of a guardian
of the person," the adjudication of incompetency entails certain le-
gal disabilities regardless of the type of guardianship imposed.62
A review of the effects of the imposition of guardianship reveals
that the deprivations suffered by the ward may be substantial.63 A
finding of incompetency significantly affects the ward's property in-
terests.64 The ward is "incapable of making any contract or gift or
any instrument in writing after he is adjudged incompetent and
before he is adjudged to have regained his competency."65 This ef-
fectively deprives the incompetent of the right to engage in business
dealings. Thus, the ward may not only be precluded from engaging
in such major transactions as the conveyance of real or personal
property,66 making of inter-vivos transfers,67 and the execution of a
valid will,68 but may also be incapacitated from such common activi-
ties as maintaining a checking account or even entering into an em-
whether the guardianship is of the estate, person, or both. Although local Orphans' Court
rules and practices may provide for the issuance of specific decrees, there still exists the possi-
bility that a finding of incompetence will result simply in a decree of "guardianship."
61. The powers, duties, and liabilities of a guardian of a person have not been delineated
by the statute, as they have been for a guardian of the estate. Guardianship of the person has
generally been overshadowed by guardianship of the estate. Although guardianship of the
person is used in Pennsylvania, in other states the commercial nature of the institution seems
to dominate. See ALLEN, supra note 5, at 95. See also Comment, Protective Servicesfor the
Elderly. Commitment Guardianship and41ternatives, 13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 569 (1972).
62. See M. KINDRED, THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 63-92 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as KINDRED].
63. As devastating as the effects of imposing guardianship might be, it should be recalled
that its imposition is only to protect the ward from a presumably equally devastating func-
tional disability. Judge Musmanno offered the following description of that disability:
In the month indicated, a tragic misfortune befell him in the death of his wife, his
faithful and happy companion for forty years. With her death the cornerstone of his
life seemed to be taken away, and the structure of his whole existence sagged, the
doors of his communication with the outside world no longer opened easily, the win-
dows of his spiritual world fogged, the whole dwelling of his daily routine began to
show signs of deterioration, illness entered into his physical framework, and a cloud
passed over the skylight of his reason.
In re Urquhart's Estate, 431 Pa. 134, 136, 245 A.2d 141, 142-43 (1968).
64. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5521(1) (Purdon 1975) (requiring incompetent to relin-
quish possession of real and personal assets to guardian). See also note 45 supra.
65. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5524 (Purdon 1975).
66. See Stepp v. Framptom, 179 Pa. 284, 36 A. 177 (1897). But cf. 20 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 5524 (Purdon 1975) ("This section shall not impair the interest in real estate acquired
by a bona fide grantee of, or a bona fide holder of a lien on, real estate in a county other than
that in which the decree establishing the incompetency is entered, unless the decree or a dupli-
cate original or certified copy thereof is recorded in the office of the recorder of deeds in the
county in which the real estate lies before the recording or entering of the instrument or lien
under which the grantee or lien-holder claims").
67. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5524 (Purdon 1975) specifically precludes an incompetent
from making any contract or gift.
68. An adjudication of incompetency prior to execution of an otherwise valid will raises
the presumption that the testator lacked testamentary capacity. See Brennan's Estate, 312 Pa.
335, 168 A. 25 (1933); Hoffman's Estate, 209 Pa. 357, 360, 58 A. 665, 666 (1904). See also
Mulholland Estate, 217 Pa. 65, 66 A. 150 (1907) (finding of incompetency after execution of
the will may be given some weight in will contest); but see In re Estate of Hastings, 479 Pa. 122,
387 A.2d 865 (1978) (determination of incompetency shifts burden of proof to proponent of
will to show by clear and convincing evidence that at the time the will was made the testator
had testamentary capacity).
ployment contract.69 Additionally, an adjudication of incompetency
may result in the termination of the right to practice a licensed pro-
fession.7" Upon imposition of guardianship of the estate 7 1 the ward
loses the right to control and enjoy his property. He must not only
relinquish possession of his real and personal assets to his guard-
ian,72 but he is also stripped of the right to sue or defend a suit to
protect the interests in that property.73 Although management of the
estate is for the "benefit of the incompetent," 74 there exists the possi-
bility that the assets may be irrevocably placed beyond the reach of a
ward who later regains his competency.
75
The Supreme Court has recognized that the right "to acquire,
enjoy, own, and dispose of property. .. [is] an essential pre-condi-
tion to the realization of other basic civil rights and liberties."76
Deprivation of this right, therefore, must weigh heavily in the bal-
ance when determining constitutionally mandated safeguards.
Although the impact of an adjudication of incompetency on an
alleged incompetent's property interests is severe, other effects may
be even more significant. Severe deprivations of liberty may be the
fate of an adjudged incompetent.7 7 The imposition of guardianship
of an incompetent's person entails the general power to restrict the
ward's freedom. 78 Although the legislature has not specifically de-
lineated the powers of a guardian of the person, the power has been
held sufficient to allow the guardian to refuse or consent to medical
treatment for the ward, including such extreme and medically un-
necessary surgery as sterilization.79
69. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5524 (Purdon 1975).
70. In Pennsylvania, a physician's license may be revoked if that physician becomes "un-
able to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety . . . as a result of any mental or
physical condition." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 421.15(a)(5) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
71. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5521(l) (Purdon 1975). Guardianship of the person,
however, does not necessarily entail such a deprivation, though by analogy to provisions for
guardianship of minors in general it may be implied.
72. Id
73. See PA. STAT. ANN. RULE tit. 42, 2051-64 (Purdon 1975). See, e.g., In re McGuigan's
Estate, 349 Pa. 581, 37 A.2d 717 (1944).
74. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5511 (Purdon 1975); In re Sigel's Estate, 169 Pa. Super.
Ct. 425, 82 A.2d 309 (195 1) (purpose of the act is to shield mental defectives); see also Oyama
v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 643 (1947) (purpose of guardianship is to protect ward and his
property).
75. The guardian may "sell, at public or private sale, any personal property of the [in-
competent]." 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5521(22) (Purdon 1975) (incorporating 20 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 5151 (Purdon 1975)). Moreover, note that 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5536(b)
(Purdon Supp. 1979-80) permits the incompetent to be divested of his real estate. Section 5536
gives the court "the power to substitute its judgment for that of the incompetent with respect to
the estate and affairs of the incompetent. ... Id See Comment, The Application of the
Substitution of Judgment Doctrine in Planning an Incompetent's Estate, 16 VILL. L. REV. 132
(1970).
76. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 545 (1972).
77. See notes 46-52 and accompanying text supra.
78. See ALLEN supra note 5, at 95-97; KINDRED, supra note 62, at 76.
79. Null Estate, 25 Pa. Fiduc. 1, 55 Wash. 45 (Pa. C.P. Wash. 1974). This decision em-
phasizes the power that a guardian of the person has over the ward. In this case the proposed
Guardianship of the estate, though generally granting the
guardian control over the ward's pecuniary interests, may impose re-
straints on the ward's personal liberties that are equally restrictive.
Because the guardian may "change the incompetent's residence or
domicile,"" ° the ward may be forced to enter a public or private
health care institution and remain there for treatment. Thus, the
normal procedural safeguards surrounding involuntary commitment
proceedings may be circumvented at the guardian's discretion.8'
Even if the guardian does not place the ward in a facility that
imposes actual physical restraint, the ward's personal freedom may
be effectively restricted nevertheless. Since the guardian of the estate
maintains complete control of the ward's finances, 2 the ward can
scarcely be considered to possess a full measure of personal liberty.
Lacking the legal capacity to possess money or enter employment
contracts to acquire it, 3 and even lacking the legal capacity to oper-
ate an automobile, 4 the ward's freedom is almost entirely subject to
the discretion of his guardian.
The magnitude of the property and liberty deprivations the
ward suffers is increased by the fact that the deprivations are likely
to be permanent. Pennsylvania law contains no requirement that a
finding of incompetency be periodically reviewed.85 Rather, the bur-
den of petitioning for the removal of a guardianship is placed en-
tirely on the incompetent.8 6 Given the legal disabilities under which
the ward is placed, the termination of a guardianship can present an
ward, a thirty-three year old alleged retardate who had borne one child out of wedlock, was
alleged to be susceptible to sexual exploitation by designing persons. The petitioner, her
brother, stated that he was unable to monitor her conduct twenty-four hours a day. A psychia-
trist who had examined the alleged incompetent testified that sterilization would be in the
alleged incompetent's "best interests." The court held:
Helen Marie Null is in fact an incompetent person; that a guardian of her person is
necessary in order to prevent her from being sexually abused; that it is in the best
interests of this incompetent that an operation be performed which would prevent her
from having children in the event that she has sexual intercourse.
Id at 6, 55 Wash. at 48.
Compare Yetter, Alleged Incompetent, 24 Pa. Fiduc. I (C.P. Northum. 1973). In this case
the court refused appointment of a guardian of the person to consent to surgery for cancer.
Although the proposed ward had been previously committed to Allentown State [Mental] Hos-
pital, the court emphasized her lack of consent in refusing the appointment. For a discussion
of involuntary guardianship as an imposition on personal freedoms see Effland, Caringfor the
Elderly Under the Uniform Probate Code, 17 ARIz. L. REV. 373, 383 (1975).
80. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5536(b)(10) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
81. "If the guardian is permitted to [circumvent normal involuntary commitment proce-
dures] the incompetency determination assumes unusual importance in that it makes the in-
competent person subject to compulsory hospitalization at his guardian's discretion and
without the customary statutory safeguards." A.B.F. STUDY, supra note 4, at 261.
82. See notes 64-76 supra.
83. See notes 69 and 72 and accompanying text supra.
84. A finding of incapacity is grounds for revocation or denial of a driver's license. 75
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1517-1519 (Purdon 1977).
85. A decree of guardianship in Pennsylvania imposes deprivations of unlimited dura-
tion. See generally ALLEN, supra note 5, at 93.
86. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5517 (Purdon 1975).
almost insurmountable barrier to the incompetent unless accompa-
nied by the cooperation of the guardian.8" The practical result is
that the guardianship is not likely to be terminated during the life-
time of the incompetent.
88
Finally, in addition to the loss of personal and economic free-
dom, an adjudication of incompetency may entail a substantial ad-
verse psychological impact. The damage to reputation 9 and the
accompanying loss of dignity and self-esteem9" suffered by an indi-
vidual who has been adjudged to be in need of a guardian cannot be
underestimated. 9 1
As has been shown, the subject of a guardianship proceeding
has significant interests at stake. The potentially indefinite loss of
property and liberty interests, plus the psychological impact that
may result, must be accorded great weight when determining what
procedures are required for the protection of an alleged incompe-
tent's interests.
B. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation Under Current Guardianshp
Procedures and the Probable Value of Appointed Counsel
1. The Risk of "Error".-The second factor to be considered in
determining the appropriate level of due process is the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of the private interests under current proce-
dures and the value of the proposed additional procedure in reduc-
ing that risk.92
The Supreme Court has not defined "an erroneous depriva-
87. The Supreme Court has held that "the possible length of wrongful deprivation. . . is
an important factor in assessing the impact of official action on the private interests." Fusari v.
Steinburg, 419 U.S. 379, 389 (1975).
88. See also notes 145-51 and accompanying text infra.
89. In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), the Supreme Court found that the damage to
the reputation of a high school student that resulted from a ten day suspension was a "serious"
infringement on a protected liberty interest. Id at 576. See also Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972); In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 668-69 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Dale v. Hahn,
440 F.2d 633, 636 (2d Cir. 1971). But see Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976) (mere interest
in reputation does not necessitate procedural due process rights).
90. The impact of an adjudication may be especially devastating for the elderly.
Faced with declining physical ability, having lost the status and sense of value that
productive employment has provided, having experienced the dissolution of his fam-
ily structure as children drift away in our mobile society, the older person often is
faced with an identity crisis because he has lost the characteristics which are most
important to his sense of personal identity and integrity. In a society in which pro-
ductivity, physical prowess and beauty, and social acceptability are all qualities that
are highly valued, it is not surprising that the older individual often begins to doubt
his own personal worth, to become certain of his unacceptability to others and liter-
ally to 'give up.'
SPECIAL SENATE COMMITTEE ON AGING, MENTAL HEALTH CARE AND THE ELDERLY: SHORT-
COMINGS IN PUBLIC POLICY, S. REP. No. 38-596, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 147 (1971).
91. The stigma that attaches to an individual once adjudicated incompetent is likely to
affect future employment opportunities. See Comment, Limitations on Individual Rights in
California Incompetency Proceedings, 7 U. CAL. D. L. REV. 457, 479 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as CALIFORNIA INCOMPETENCY].
92. See notes 55-56 and accompanying text supra.
tion." Because "the basic purpose of a trial is the determination of
the truth, '9 3 however, whenever a deprivation results from an adju-
dication in which the "truth"94 has not been determined, the depri-
vation is erroneous. A deprivation is therefore erroneous when the
court has not determined the "truth" in either its findings of law,
findings of fact, or application of the law to the facts.9 5
a. Erroneousfinding oflaw.-Because the courts are generally
bound to follow duly enacted legislation, various constitutional de-
fects in the Pennsylvania guardianship statute create a high
probability that the court will err in its finding of law. The statute is
vulnerable to constitutional attack for overbreadth,9 6 vagueness,9
7
and failure to consider the least restrictive alternative.98 If a court in
construing the statute should fail to consider these constitutional de-
fects, and either fail to strike the defective parts or fail to construe
them in a constitutional manner, then it has committed an error in its
finding of law.9 9
Upon a showing of "good cause"" a court is authorized to im-
pose guardianship of the estate or person if the individual is unable
to properly administer his affairs or person or protect his property
from the designs of others.'' The Pennsylvania statute that grants
93. Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966). "The object of a
lawsuit is to get at the truth and arrive at the right result. That is the sole objective ...." D.
PECK, THE COMPLEMENT OF COURT AND COUNSEL 9 (1954) (13th Annual Benjamin N. Car-
doza Lecture).
94. The "truth" is admittedly an elusive term that does not yield to clear and universal
definition. It may be loosely identified as "conformity with fact .... Agreement with a stan-
dard or rule; accuracy, correctness." Xl OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 435 (1970).
95. It might be argued that while findings of fact are amendable to a determination of the
"truth," findings of law and applications of law to fact are not. Because law and its application
are constructs of man's intellect, and have no basis in physical reality, there can be no objective
determination of their "truth." For the purposes of this comment, erroneous findings of law
and application of law to fact will mean those findings and applications which, if taken to the
highest court of appeals, would be found not in accord with the required standards.
96. See, e.g., Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938, 951 (D.C. 111. 1968). Seea/so notes 101-
05 and accompanying text infra.
97. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972). See also
notes 106-07 and accompanying text infra.
98. See, e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on other
procedural grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974),
vacated and remanded 421 U.S. 957 (1975), reinstatedon remand, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis.
1976). See also notes 108-11 and accompanying text infra.
99. Note that when a court applies a law unconstitutionally, the error is in the finding of
law, not in the application of law to fact. The error that a court would commit in applying the
guardianship statute in an unconstitutionally broad manner would be in finding erroneously
that the law permitted such an application when "in truth" it does not. Error in application of
law to fact refers to an error in the process of applying the law to the facts. See note I Il and
accompanying text infra.
100. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5511(a) (Purdon 1975).
101. "Incompetent" means a person who
this authority may be unconstitutionally overbroad."°2
When "the language of the statute, given its normal meaning, is
so broad that its sanctions may apply to conduct protected by the
Constitution," '0 3 the statute is constitutionally defective. The stan-
dard applied in Pennsylvania may be overbroad because it permits
adjudication of incompetency upon a showing of a mere likelihood
of the proposed ward's dissipation of property or victimization
rather than upon actual proof. In failing to require proof of past
incidents in which the individual's property was dissipated or in
which he was the victim of designing persons, the statute places the
classes of elderly persons, mentally ill and deficient, retardates, drug
addicts, and inebriates in jeopardy of losing significant property and
liberty interests upon a showing of a mere "likelihood" that guardi-
anship is in the alleged incompetent's best interests. This allows the
imposition of guardianship in an impermissibly broad number of
cases in which the benefits of guardianship are nonexistent and the
burdens highly apparent.'o4 Because use of theparenspatriae power
to impose guardianship can be justified only when the ward benefits
from the added protections to his person and estate, 05 liberty and
property restrictions that are only likely to benefit the ward are not
justified. Should a court fail to narrowly construe these standards so
that such an abuse of the parenspatriae power is avoided, it would
err in its finding of law.
because of infirmities of old age, mental illness, mental deficiency or retardation,
drug addiction or inebriety [the individual]
(I) is unable to manage his property, or is liable to dissipate it or become the
victim of designing persons; or
(2) lacks sufficient capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions con-
cerning his person.
20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5501(l)-(2) (Purdon 1975).
102. The constitutional doctrine of overbreadth should not be confused with the doctrine
of vagueness, either of which may render a statute void. Vague laws violate procedural due
process because they fail to delimit with sufficient clarity that activity that envokes the prohibi-
tions of the statute, which denies the public an opportunity to avoid the conduct and invites
arbitrary enforcement. Overly broad laws, however, violate substantive due process because
their language permits their application to individuals and conduct that does not require depri-
vation by the state. See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
103. Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938, 951 (D.C. Il1. 1968).
Frequently, the resolution of this issue depends upon whether the statute permits.
officials to wield unlimited discretionary powers in its enforcement. If the scope of
the power permitted these officials is so broad that the exercise of constitutionally
protected conduct depends on their own subjective views as to the propriety of the
conduct, the statute is unconstitutional.
1d at 951-52. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 (1965); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415,433, 435-36 (1963). See generally Collings, Unconstitutional Uncertainty -
An Appraisal, 40 CORNELL L. REV. 195 (1955); Note, The Voidfor- Vagueness Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960) [hereinafter cited as VAGUENESs DOCTRINE].
104. The term "likelihood" conveys the notion of mere probability: a chance of 50.1%
would satisfy this standard. Thus, when an individual has a 50.1% chance of dissipating his
property or becoming the victim of a designing person, if the individual falls within the class of
persons delineated by 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5501 (Purdon 1975), an elderly person for
example, then he may be found "incompetent."
105. See notes 8-9 and accompanying text supra.
The guardianship statute is also subject to constitutional attack
for vagueness. A law is constitutionally defective when it is "so
vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the
conduct it prohibits or leaves judges and jurors free to decide, with-
out any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in
each particular case."' 6 The terms "mental illness" and "mental de-
ficiency" may describe a wide variety of intellectual incapacity and
accompanying behavior. The term "responsible decisions" is simi-
larly open ended. These standards may "impermissibly [delegate]
basic policy matters to. . .judges and juries for resolution on an ad
hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and
discriminatory application."'' 07 Although vague standards increase
the likelihood that a court may erroneously apply the law to a spe-
cific set of facts, if the standards are vague beyond constitutional
boundaries a court's failure to strike the standards as impermissibly
vague is in itself an error in the finding of law.'0 8
Finally, the risk of an erroneous finding of law is further in-
creased by the failure to include in the statute the requirement that
the imposition of guardianship be the least restrictive alternative by
which the goals of protecting the incompetent and his estate may be
achieved. The Supreme Court has announced that "even though the
governmental purpose be legitimate. . . that purpose cannot be pur-
sued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties
when the end can be more narrowly achieved."' 09 In Pennsylvania,
however, a declaration of incompetency and the ensuing appoint-
ment of a guardian may entail broad decrees that do not relate the
attendant legal disabilities to the functional disabilities of the
ward.' '0 These plenary deprivations may impose greater restrictions
106. Giacco v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03 (1966). See also VAGUENESS Doc-
TRINE, note 103, supra.
107. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972). See also Connally v. Gen-
eral Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (Oklahoma statute was void when "so vague that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its applica-
tion").
108. Constitutional interpretation of a statute does not cure vagueness problems. Al-
though a considerable body of case law might develop to guide courts in the objective adminis-
tration of a statute, this does not remedy the lack of adequate notice of the law's meaning to
the public. See Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 403 (1966).
109. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). The least restrictive alternative doctrine
has gained significant acceptance in the mental health care field. See Halderman v. Pennhurst
State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Eubanks v. Clarke, 434 F. Supp.
1022 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Dixon v. Attorney General of Pa., 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971). See
generally Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on other procedural
grounds. 414 U.S. 473 (1974), on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated and
remanded, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), reinstated on remand, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976);
Commonwealth ex rel. Finken v. Roop, 234 Pa. Super. Ct. 155, 339 A.2d 764 (1975). More-
over, Pennsylvania has statutorily mandated application of the least restrictive alternative doc-
trine for civil commitment proceedings. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7206 (Purdon Supp. 1978).
110. See note 60 and accompanying text supra. Note also that
[a] more fruitful approach is to realize that it is not the abstract inability to manage
property but rather the effect of that inability, which is the evil sought to be cured by
than are necessary for the preventative and protective purposes that
justify the use of theparenspatriae power."' Should a court fail to
interpret the standards as requiring that imposition of plenary
guardianship be the least restrictive alternative suitable to the state's
goals, then it has erred in its finding of law.
b. Erroneous finding offact.-An erroneous deprivation may
also result when a court finds as a fact that which, in reality, is not
true. The current guardianship procedures in Pennsylvania do not
foster a full exposition of the relevant facts. Rather, the procedures
encourage an ex parte adjudication based on unchallenged evidence
offered by a party whose interests are likely to be adverse to the in-
terests of the alleged incompetent." ,2 These procedural deficiencies
increase the likelihood that the court will err in its findings of fact.
Guardianship in Pennsylvania is initiated by filing a petition. '13
The petitioner may be anyone' who is interested in the alleged in-
competent's welfare. Although this broad grant of standing in-
creases the availability of guardianship to those who actually need
it, II it also increases the risk that the petitioner will be one who is
concerned not with the welfare of the alleged incompetent, but with
the disposition of the alleged incompetent's assets. 1 6 Protection of
the statute. A person may be a blithering, drunken idiot who doesn't know a dollar
bill from a Kleenex; but, if his economic needs are being adequately satisfied, he
should be permitted to blither in unmolested bliss.
Comment, An Assessment of the Pennsylvania Estate Guardianship Incompetency Standard, 124
U. PA. L. REV. 1048, 1066 (1976).
111. Because of the severity of the deprivations involved, involuntary guardianship should
only be utilized as a last resort. There are a number of less restrictive alternatives available.
Among the traditional alternatives are inter vivos trust funds, power of attorney, contracts for
lifetime personal care, annunities, or the transfer of property to another. For another alterna-
tive method of providing for the de facto incompetent see UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 5-409
(5th ed. 1977). See also ALLEN, supra note 5, at 97. The most obvious alternative is to tailor
the guardianship decree so that the ward's legal disability is no greater than his functional
disability. In 1978, legislation was introduced in Pennsylvania that was designed to require
guardianship decrees to match the incompetent's functional disability. After passing unani-
mously in the Pennsylvania House of Representatives the bill died in the Senate judiciary
committee. See H.R. 2162, Pa. Gen. Ass., 162d Sess. (1978). Similar legislation has been
introduced in 1979 but has not, as of the date of this writing, been acted upon. See note 10
supra.
112. Petitioners are most often relatives, ALLEN, supra note 5, at 78 and 238, who are also
likely to have an interest in preserving the estate of the alleged incompetent.
113. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5511(a) (Purdon 1975).
114. Id See generally ALLEN, supra note 5, at 78-79.
115. It would not benefit those who actually need the protections of guardianship to limit
those who may petition the court. In some instances there may be no relatives or friends to
initiate the proceedings. Thus, it is desirable to allow any party that is concerned with the
alleged incompetent's welfare to petition for guardianship. This should not be interpreted,
however, to allow creditors and heirs to deprive the alleged incompetent of control of his
assets. "The sole objective of... [guardianship] proceedings is the preservation of the estate
for the ward and for no one else . In re Palmer Estate, 99 Pitts. L.J. 479, 483 (Pa. C.P.
Alleg. 1951).
116. For instances in which the proceedings were initiated by self-interested petitioners
see Denner v. Beyer, 352 Pa. 386, 42 A.2d 747 (1945); Mulholland's Estate, 217 Pa. 65, 66 A.
150 (1907); Bryden's Estate, 211 Pa. 633, 61 A. 250 (1905); Hudak Appeal, 170 Pa. Super. Ct.
the ward's estate is solely for the benefit of the ward, not the ward's
heirs or creditors.' '7 The possibility that the petitioner is motivated
by self interest increases the likelihood that the evidence he presents
may not be credible. It is, therefore, essential that the credibility of
such evidence be tested.
Procedures under Pennsylvania law, however, are not designed
to facilitate the testing of the credibility of the petitioner's evidence
because they in effect encourage ex parte adjudications.' 8 Although
the law provides that the alleged incompetent shall be notified of and
present at the hearing, both provisions are defective to a degree that
defeats their purpose.
The statute states that
notice of the petition and hearing shall be given in such a manner
as the court shall direct to the alleged incompetent, to all persons
residing within the Commonwealth. . .[that would be entitled to
take under the laws of intestate succession] and to such other par-
ties as the court may direct. '9
Adequate notice of the proceeding in which an individual may be
deprived of constitutionally protected rights is a fundamental aspect
of procedural due process. 20  Notice must be "reasonably calcu-
lated, under all the circumstances, to appraise interested parties of
the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present
their objections."' 2' The provisions for notice to the alleged incom-
petent are deficient for two reasons. First, they fail to require that
the proposed ward be informed of his procedural rights to be present
at the hearing and represented by counsel. Second, they fail to take
into account the alleged mental deficiency of the proposed ward who
may not understand the import of the notice. 22 Thus, instead of
74, 84 A.2d 226 (1951); Owens Appeal, 167 Pa. Super. Ct. 10, 74 A.2d 705 (1950); in re Brinton,
86 Pa. Super. Ct. 194, _ A. _ (1925); Lancaster Estate, 13 Bucks County L Rptr. 312 (Pa.
C.P. 1963).
117. One possible solution would be to require the court to make an affirmative finding
that the petition was in fact filed in the ward's best interests. Although presently the petition
may be dismissed where the court "finds as a fact that the proceeding has not been instituted to
aid or benefit the alleged incompetent," 20 PA. CONS. STAT ANN. § 551 l(a) (Purdon 1975),
since the alleged incompetent is so seldom present or represented by counsel, the issue of the
petitioner's interest is not likely to be scrutinized.
118. See ALLEN, supra note 5, at 83.
119. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5511(a) (Purdon 1975).
120. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Grannis v.
Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914). Note that notice provisions may be constitutional on their face
yet be unconstitutional as applied. See. e.g.. Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956).
121. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.. 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
122. See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded
for a more specfic injunctive order. 414 U.S. 473 (1974). amended opinion. 379 F. Supp. 1376
(E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated and remanded, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), which held that
[niotice of date, time and place is not satisfactory. The patient should be informed on
the basis for his detention, his right to jury trial, the standard upon which he may be
detained, the names of examining physicians and all other persons who may testify in
favor of his continued detention, and the substance of their proposed testimony.
349 F. Supp. 1078, 1092 (E.D. Wis. 1972). See also Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141
(1956) (even though the notice given was statutorily adequate, because the recipient was a
appraising the alleged incompetent of the action and affording him
an opportunity to present objections, the statutory notice require-
ments actually increase the likelihood that the proposed ward will
not defend.
The statute further provides that the alleged incompetent shall
be present at the hearing, unless "because of his physical or mental
condition his welfare would not be promoted."' 23 Although the stat-
ute requires the presentation of "positive testimony" before the ab-
sence of the proposed ward will be excused,' 24 the discretion with
which the court is vested often facilitates omission of the require-
ment. Frequently, the "positive testimony" consists of a cursory
statement or affidavit of a physician or hospital director that merely
recites the language of the statute.'25 Although the presence of the
proposed ward may in fact not be in his best interests, 2 6 his absence
from the hearing deprives the court of the important opportunity to
observe the demeanor of the one who is alleged to require the pro-
tection of guardianship.' 27 Moreover, the ease with which his ab-
sence may be excused, coupled with the inadequacies of the notice
requirement, increases the likelihood that there will be no one to
actively challenge the credibility of the evidence offered by the peti-
tioner. 128
The admission of hearsay evidence further increases the possi-
bility that the court will err in its findings of fact. The statute per-
mits the sworn statement of any physician or director of any hospital
to be admitted into evidence in lieu of his personal testimony to the
extent that the evidence relates to the mental condition of any pa-
tient in that hospital. 29 Hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible
"known incompetent," unable to understand the nature of the proceedings, compliance with
an otherwise valid statute was not "reasonably calculated" and therefore inadequate).
123. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 551 l(a)(l) (Purdon 1975).
124. Id See also In re Ryman, 139 Pa. Super. Ct. 212, II A.2d 677 (1940).
125. See Application for a Rule to Show Cause Why a Writ of Prohibition Should Not be
Granted, Ex Parte: Developmental Disabilities Advocacy Network, Inc., - Pa. - (No. I
Misc., 1979 Term) (alleged that in two days of proceedings the Orphans' Court Division of the
Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County considered petitions that sixty mostly mentally
disabled persons be declared incompetent and a guardian of their estate appointed. The ab-
sence of the proposed ward was typically excused by a psychiatrist's affidavit stating that the
welfare of the alleged incompetent would not be promoted by his presence in court).
126. Many subjects of incompetency proceedings are physically and mentally disabled to
the extent that removal from their normal environment would be disruptive of their physical
or emotional well being. See generally ALLEN, supra note 5, at 83-84.
127. See, e.g., In re Urquhart's Estate, 431 Pa. 134, 142, 245 A.2d 141, 146 (1968) ("One
cannot read the testimony of Mr. Urquhart. . .without concluding that he was quite familiar
with the orbiting of his own world on its economic axis"); Ryman's Case, 139 Pa. Super. Ct.
212, 218, 11 A.2d 677, 680 (1940) ("One's mental capacity is best determined by his spoken
words, his acts and conduct"); Yetter, Alleged Incompetent. 24 Pa. Fiduc. 1, 4 (C.P. Northum.
1973) ("At the hearing Mrs. Yetter was alert, interested, and obviously meticulous about her
personal appearance").
128. "[Flairness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination of facts decisive
of rights." Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170 (1951).
129. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5518 (Purdon 1975).
because the declarant cannot be cross-examined, and thus, there is
no way to challenge its veracity. 30 Admission of hearsay evidence
on the mental state of the alleged incompetent increases the risk of
an error in the finding of fact for two reasons. First, unreliable evi-
dence will go undetected. Second, the medical hearsay is likely to
further confuse the distinction between evidence of medical disabil-
ity and evidence of legal disability."'3 Denial of the opportunity to
test the veracity of medical evidence that is frequently, though unjus-
tifiably, 132 dispositive of the issue of incompetency, thus introduces a
significant risk that guardianship will be imposed based on an er-
roneous finding of fact.
Finally, the findings of fact in guardianship proceedings may be
erroneous because of the light burden of proof required of the peti-
tioner. In Pennsylvania the petitioner must establish the incompe-
tence of the proposed ward by "the preponderance of the
evidence."'' 33 The value of the heavier burden of "proof beyond a
reasonable doubt," which is applicable to crminal proceedings,'
34
has been recognized as a more effective means by which to assure
accuracy in the fact finding process. '3  Although the civil label of
guardianship proceedings has been used to justify the lighter stan-
dard, 136 the risk of an erroneous finding of fact is nevertheless in-
creased.
c. Erroneous applications of law tofact.-In applying the law
to the facts, a court must examine the evidence to determine whether
it is sufficient to warrant the sanctions of the applicable law. Even if
the law and facts have been found correctly, a court may neverthe-
less make a determination based on insufficient evidence.137 Exami-
130. C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 245 (2d ed.
E.W. Cleary 1972).
131.
In practice the medical standard becomes the primary, if not sole, basis for adjudicat-
ing incompetency. No specific inquiry is made into the way in which the particular
aberrational condition affects the subject's ability to manage his financial re-
sources. . . .The legal profession therefore abrogates the decision making power to
the medical profession.
G. ALEXANDER & T. LEWIN, THE AGED AND THE NEED FOR SURROGATE MANAGEMENT 25
(1972). See also A.B.F. STUDY, supra note 4, at 251.
132. Id
133. See In re Urquhart's Estate, 431 Pa. 134, 245 A.2d 141 (1968); Coulter Estate, 406 Pa.
402, 178 A.2d 742 (1962). Cf. Meyers Estate, 395 Pa. 459, 462-63, 150 A.2d 525, 527 (1959)
(petitioner must present "evidence [that] is preponderating and points unerringly to mental
incompetency").
134. C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 341 [2d ed.
E. W. Cleary 1972).
135. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Finken v. Roop, 234 Pa. Super. Ct. 155, 339 A.2d
764 (1975). This case indicates that use of the parenspatriae power is nevertheless subject to
strict requirements of due process.
136. Id
137. See note 95 and accompanying text supra. A deprivation that occurs when the evi-
nation of the case law reveals that the courts frequently exhibit a
paternalistic attitude towards alleged incompetents138 by focusing on
the beneficial protections of guardianship and ignoring the attendant
burdensome deprivations. 139 Thus, courts may be inclined to find
that merely eccentric or imprudent behavior is sufficient evidence of
incompetency.' 4 This judicial predisposition negates the presump-
tion that the subject of a guardianship proceeding is competent until
proven otherwise by the preponderance of the evidence. '4
Pennsylvania recognizes the right of a proposed ward to have
the issue of his incompetency decided by a jury upon request. '42 Be-
cause the determination of incompetency involves the question of
what behavior constitutes the incapacity to manage one's personal or
financial affairs, determination by a jury of laymen applying com-
munity standards could obviate any judicial predisposition. 4 3 The
statute, however, places the burden of requesting a jury on the al-
leged incompetent.'"I Since the alleged incompetent is so rarely
present or represented, however, such requests are seldom made.
Thus, incompetency hearings rarely proceed before a jury. 145 The
effect of judicial paternalism is, therefore, likely to be more perva-
sive.
Additionally, should a court err in its application of law to fact,
the procedures for appeal and termination of guardianship are un-
likely to afford relief. Although the ward has the right to appeal the
initial adjudication of incompetency, these appeals are rare. 146 The
appeals that are taken are seldom successful due to the considerable
discretion vested in courts handling guardianship proceedings' 47 and
the deference that appellate courts traditionally accord lower courts'
findings of fact. 4' The appeal process, therefore, is not likely to
remedy a determination based on insufficient evidence. Moreover,
an erroneous deprivation is unlikely to be remedied under the proce-
dence is insufficient to support the decision occurs as the result of an erroneous application of
law to fact.
138. See Comment, An Assessment of the PennsI/vania Estate Guardianship Incompeteny
Standard, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1048, 1075-77 (1976).
139. E.g., Card Appeal, 177 Pa. Super. Ct. 502, 110 A.2d 856(1955). But see, In re Owen's
Estate, 167 Pa. Super. Ct. 10, 74 A.2d 705 (1950).
140. See, e.g.. Nagle Estate, 418 Pa. 170, 210 A.2d 262 (1965); Shepard Estate, 10 Pa. D. &
C.2d 712 (C.P. Del. 1956), al'd per curiam, 391 Pa. 102, 137 A.2d 298 (1958). In re Guzzi's
Estate, 50 Lack. J. 139 (Pa. C.P. Lack. 1948).
141. See notes 133-36 and accompanying text supra.
142. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5511(2) (Purdon 1975).
143. See notes 138-41 and accompanying text supra.
144. "The hearing may be closed to the public and without jury unless the alleged incom-
petent or his counsel objects." 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 551 l(a) (Purdon 1975).
145. See ALLEN, supra note 5, at 85.
146. Id at 93.
147. See In re Urquhart Estate, 418 Pa. 185, 210 A.2d 269 (1965); In re Nagle Estate, 418
Pa. 170, 210 A.2d 262 (1965); In re Coulter's Estate, 406 Pa. 402, 178 A.2d 742 (1962).
148. See, e.g.. Id
dures for termination of guardianship. Under the current process
the adjudged incompetent not only bears the burden of initiating the
review of his own competence,' 49 but also bears the burden of per-
suasion. °50 Petitioner for an adjudication of competency faces the
presumption of incompetency. 15 Overcoming this presumption is
likely to be difficult given paternalistic judicial attitudes.
52
2. The Value of Appointed Counsel.-The preceding analysis
indicates that the risk of an erroneous deprivation in guardianship
proceedings is great. The probable value of counsel in reducing this
risk is also considerable. Presently, although Pennsylvania recog-
nizes the alleged incompetent's right to have counsel present at the
incompetency hearing, 53 there is no provision requiring such repre-
sentation. Because alleged incompetents are rarely represented by
counsel mandated representation would transform what is typically
an ex parte proceeding into an adversary proceeding. Although the
adversary system has been highly criticized as an effective means of
finding the "truth,"'' 54 the Supreme Court has affirmed its belief in
the adversary system by requiring counsel for criminal defend-
ants. 15  As the following analysis indicates, mandatory appointment
of counsel for alleged incompetents in guardianship proceedings also
would be of great value in protecting against erroneous deprivations.
The appointment of counsel for the alleged incompetent would
significantly reduce the risk of an erroneous finding of law. Not only
could counsel assist the court in determining the extent of any consti-
tutional defects in the substantive standard, but could also aid the
court in construing the standard constitutionally by actively advocat-
ing against a construction that would violate constitutional princi-
ples of overbreadth, vagueness, or least restrictive alternative.156 For
example, counsel might challenge the sufficiency of a petition that
failed to allege that other less restrictive alternatives had been ex-
plored and that guardianship had been found the least restrictive of
149. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5517 (Purdon 1975).
150. See In re Pearlman, 400 Pa. 350, 163 A.2d 530 (1960) (petitioner must prove his
competency by a fair preponderance of the evidence).
151. Id.
152. See notes 138-41 and accompanying text supra.
153. The right is implied in the wording of the statute. See PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 551 l(a) (Purdon 1975).
154. See, e.g., Frankel, The Search For Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031
(1975). But see Freeman, Judge Frankel's Searchfor Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1060 (1975);
Uviller, The Adocate, the Truth, and Judicial Hackles: A Reaction to Judge Frankers Idea, 123
U. PA. L. REV. 1067 (1975).
155. See notes 18-20 and accompanying text supra.
156. Representation by counsel would be especially important in the assertion of the right
to the least restrictive alternative. Since the burden satisfying the doctrine falls on the party
who seeks to impose the restrictions. E.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Finken v. Roop, 234 Pa.
Super. Ct. 155, 339 A.2d 764 (1975).
the suitable alternatives.
157
Appointed counsel would also be valuable in reducing the risk
of error in the fact finding process. An attorney might assist in
presenting information relevant to the petitioner's self-interested mo-
tivation, which would insure that the proceeding has been brought
"for the benefit of the alleged incompetent."'' 58 Appointed counsel
would also serve as a watchdog of the alleged incompetent's proce-
dural rights by challenging the sufficiency of notice or the excuse of
the alleged incompetent's absence.' 59 Perhaps most important, the
attorney's skills as a cross-examiner may provide the only effective
means by which to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence offered
by the petitioner on the issue of incompetency. 60 The attorney's
ability to test the credibility of evidence and point out distinctions
between evidence of medical and legal disability is crucial given the
lighter burden of proof employed in guardianship proceedings.
Additionally, counsel would be of value in reducing the risk of
an erroneous application of law to fact. Paternalistic attitudes may
be less likely to manifest themselves in the presence of a forceful
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.' 6' Moreover, counsel
could aid in the assertion of the right to jury trial to obviate such
predisposition. Finally, should an erroneous finding occur, the effec-
tive assistance of counsel would be crucial to the appeal and termi-
nation processes. 1
62
C Interest of State- Avoidance of Administrative Delay and
Expense
The final factor to be considered in the Mathews v. Eldridge bal-
ancing formula is the interest of the government, "including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural safeguards would entail."'
163 If
due process requires mandatory appointment of counsel, the state
will be compelled to provide representation for indigents and
nonindigents alike. 164 The most apparent burden accompanying
157. For a listing of some of the alternatives to guardianship see note Ill supra.
158. See notes 113-17 supra.
159. See notes 118-28 and accompanying text supra.
160. See notes 129-32 and accompanying text supra.
161. See notes 137-41 and accompanying text supra.
162. See notes 146-52 and accompanying text supra.
163. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 336 (1976).
164. Usually, mandatory court appointment of counsel is triggered by an individual's in-
digence. The interests at stake in the proceedings are deemed so significant that society bears
the financial costs. For the alleged incompetent, however, it is not inability to pay that threat-
ens to deprive the individual of the assistance of counsel, but the inability to assert the right.
See Section VI infra.
Court appointment of counsel for nonindigents is not without precedent in Pennsylvania.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 9960.6(c) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80) requires the public defender to
represent the subject of civil commitment proceedings when so directed by the court. Subsec-
such a requirement is the financial cost of attorneys' fees.' 65 Al-
though the expense of providing attorneys to alleged incompetents
should be assumed initially by the state, there are possibilities for
reducing the ultimate expenditure. The government should be per-
mitted to seek reimbursement for attorney's fees from those alleged
incompetents who are not indigent and who did not effect a knowing
and intelligent waiver of the right to representation by counsel. 166
Moreover, with the increased availability of legal service corpora-
tions 167 and the rise of private corporations solely formed to protect
the rights of mentally disabled individuals, 168 the financial burden of
providing for the representation of indigents may also be reduced
considerably. Ultimately, however, the mandatory appointment of
counsel will result in some financial burden to the state.
Fiscal concerns notwithstanding, the government also has a sub-
stantial interest in conserving scarce administrative resources.
Mandatory provision of counsel will undoubtedly increase the
number of contested petitions. 69  Although the government has a
significant interest in avoiding the burdens that this increase in the
number of adversary hearings would place on the court system, this
interest may have been waived. The statute specifically provides that
an alleged incompetent may have counsel represent him at the
guardianship proceeding.'7 ° Thus, the state would appear to have
renounced any interest in a nonadversary hearing. The possible side
effects that additional adversary proceedings may have on adminis-
tion (c) is specifically exempt from the requirement that the recipient of such representation be
indigent.
165. Nevertheless, "[f]inancial cost alone is not of controlling weight in determining
whether due process requires a particular procedural safeguard." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 348 (1976).
166. Policy would seem to dictate that the public should not be forced to bear the expense
of exercising the right to representation, absent a compelling need like an individual's indi-
gency. Rather, the government should be required to bear only the cost of according the indi-
vidual that right. Thus, absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, the nonindigent should be
required to reimburse the state for the cost of attorney's fees. Note, however, that under PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 9960.6 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80), a nonindigent subject to civil commit-
ment proceedings may be provided legal representation with costs born entirely by the state.
The problem of reimbursement of the state by the nonindigent may require legislation.
Although actions in quantum meruit may lie for such services, problems nevertheless persist
concerning the unconstitutionality of the "taking" and the ability of the alleged incompetent to
waive appointment of counsel. On the inherent problems of an alleged incompetent waiving
the right to representation see Comment, Probate Code Conservatorships: .4 Legislative Grant
of New Procedural Protections, 8 PAC. L.J. 73, 95-97 (1977).
167. See generally Hannon, From Politics to Reality. An Historical Perspective of the Legal
Services Corporation, 25 EMORY L.J. 639 (1976).
168. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6001-6081 (1977) (Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill
of Rights).
169. Statistical surveys indicate that representation by counsel of the subjects of civil com-
mitment proceedings has a significant effect on reducing the likelihood of commitment. See
KINDRED, supra note 62, at 605; Gupta, New York's Mental Health Information Service. An
Experiment in Due Process, 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 405, 438 (1971). A similar effect may be
predicated for guardianship proceedings.
170. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5511(a) (Purdon 1975).
trative costs are, therefore, not valid considerations. The state
should not be heard to allege that it has a valid interest in preventing
increased numbers from taking advantage of a statutory provision it
has already enacted.' 7
Fiscal and administrative burdens are not the only governmen-
tal interests involved. Because the government represents the public
interest generally, the social costs must also be analyzed.' 72 Society
has an interest in protecting those individuals who are unable to pro-
tect themselves and attempts to accomplish this through the imposi-
tion of guardianship.'73 It may be argued that appointment of
counsel to represent the alleged incompetent's interest will reduce
the availability of guardianship to those who actually need its pro-
tections.'74 It is posited that since he is an advocate the alleged in-
competent's counsel will be required to strive to defeat the petition
regardless of the consequences to the proposed ward. Counsel for
the alleged incompetent is likely to succeed in a number of cases
because of the technical error of the petitioner. This would deprive
some incompetents of the protections of guardianship. 7 5 These ar-
guments are difficult to adequately rebut, but counsel's role as advo-
cate need not always require him to seek the defeat of a petition for
guardianship. Presently, the legal community is divided over the is-
sue of whether an attorney representing an allegedly mentally defi-
cient client should abandon the traditional role of advocate and
independently determine what is in his client's best interests.'7 6 Ab-
sent a wholesale substitution of the lawyer's judgment for that of the
171. See also note 165 and accompanying text supra. Comment, Limitations on Individual
Rights in California Incompetency Proceedings, 7 U. CAL. D. L. REV. 457, 461 n.20 (1974).
172. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347 (1976).
173. One commentator has argued that
three social interests are asserted in guardianship - first, the social interest in the
general security expressed in the interest of society in the security of acquisition and
the security of transactions; second, the social interest in conservation of social re-
sources including the human assets of society expressed by the parenspatriae power
of the state over infants, lunatics and idiots; and third, the social interest in the indi-
vidual life which has been recognized in three forms in common law or in legislation,
ie., individual self-assertion, individual opportunity, and individual conditions of
life.
Id. at 461, n.20.
174. Those persons who need guardianship yet are not afforded its protections are made
up of two subgroups. "These include the 'de facto incompetent,' who for some reason has not
been adjudicated incompetent, but who would be so adjudicated if brought to court; and the
quasi-incompetent, who, while not sufficiently impaired to be determined incompetent by law,
nevertheless needs assistance in managing his property." Id at 462.
175. See, e.g., Ex Parte v. Briskey, 35 MONTG. 336 (Pa. C.P. Montg. 1919).
176. The problems inherent in representing a mentally disabled individual are recognized
in the Pennsylvania Code of Professional Responsibility. See PA. CODE PRO. REP. EC 7-1 I,
EC 7-12. For a discussion of the ethical dilemma facing an attorney presented with this situa-
tion see Comment, The Role of Counsel in the Civil Commitment Process: 4 Theoretical Frame-
work, 84 YALE L.J. 1540 (1975). See also Andalman & Chambers, Effective Counselfor
Persons Facing Civil Commitment. A Survey, a Polemic, and a Proposal, 45 Miss. L.J. 43
(1974); Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 44 TEX. L.
REv. 424 (1966). See also note 177 infra.
court, 177 however, appointed representation of the alleged incompe-
tent's interests will reduce the availability of the protections of
guardianship. 
7 1
Thus, court appointment of counsel will result in at least some
increased costs to the government. Although added administrative
burdens may not be considered, the cost of providing indigents with
counsel will result in added fiscal burdens. Additionally, court ap-
pointed counsel that adopt an adversary role may reduce the availa-
bility of guardianship to some individuals who are actually in need
of its protection.
V. Balancing the Interests
The preceding analysis indicates that although the protected
property and liberty interests at stake for an alleged incompetent are
significant, 79 the procedures under Pennsylvania guardianship laws
create a high risk that these interests will be erroneously deprived.' 80
Appointment of counsel to represent the interests of the proposed
ward would significantly reduce the risk of an erroneous depriva-
tion.'"" The costs of appointing counsel include the increased fiscal
burden of providing counsel to indigents and the societal expense of
reducing the availability of the protections of guardianship to those
who may actually need them.
8 2
Consideration of these factors leads to the conclusion that
mandatory appointment of counsel in guardianship proceedings
should be recognized as a requirement of due process. The costs to
the government and society are outweighed by the need to protect
the individual's significant interests from the high risk of erroneous
deprivation. Although the preceding analysis seems to compel this
conclusion, determination of procedural due process requires more
than an ad hoc weighing of interests. 183  Ultimately, the require-
ments of due process depend on basic notions of fairness. 84 In the
177. When a lawyer does abandon the advocate's stance and ceases to represent the inter-
ests of the client as the client defines them, if the attorney decides not to oppose a petition for
guardianship, the decision of counsel may be tantamount to a court adjudication.
178. See note 169 and accompanying text supra.
179. See SECTION IV, A supra.
180. See SECTION IV, B, I supra.
181. See SECTION IV, B, 2 supra.
182. See SECTION IV, C supra.
183. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976).
184.
The ultimate balance involves a determination as to when, under our constitutional
system . . . procedures must be imposed . . . to assure fairness. The essence of due
process is the requirement that 'a person in jeopardy of serious loss [be given] notice
of the case against him and opportunity to meet it.' All that is necessary is that the
procedures be tailored, in light of the decision to be made, to 'the capacities and
circumstances of those who are to be heard' . to insure that they are given a mean-
ingful opportunity to present their case.
Id at 349-50.
seminal decision of In re Gault85 in which the due process clause
was first interpreted to require court appointed counsel in a noncrim-
inal setting, the Court found that the assistance of counsel was so
essential for the determination of delinquency that it must be ac-
corded the juvenile as a right. '86 When the indigency of the juvenile
or his family threatened to render that right nugatory, the state was
required to assume the burden of restoring meaning to the right.
Therefore, absent a waiver by the juvenile, the state was required to
provide counsel at its own expense. 187
In guardianship proceedings, the nature of the potential depri-
vation and the value of appointed counsel in avoiding an erroneous
deprivation are analogous to that in juvenile proceedings. There-
fore, the right to be represented by counsel should be accorded the
alleged incompetent. In guardianship proceedings, however, it is not
the indigency of the proposed ward that threatens to render the right
to representation of counsel nugatory. Rather, the potential inability
of the proposed ward to make a meaningful decision to retain coun-
sel threatens the right. Because the petitioner in a guardianship pro-
ceeding must allege that the proposed ward is unable to responsibly
protect his own interests, the nature of the proceeding itself suggests
that the state should be required to shoulder the burden of restoring
meaning to the right. This means the state must mandate appoint-
ment of counsel for the alleged incompetent. Only by imposing this
requirement will guardianship procedure be "tailored, in light of the
decision to be made, to the capacities and circumstances of those
who are to be heard . . . to insure that they are given a meaningful
opportunity to present their case."' 88 Mandatory representation is,
therefore, required to insure that the procedures are basically fair.
185. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
186. Id at 41. In Gault the Court stressed that juvenile proceedings "may result in com-
mitment to an institution in which the juvenile's freedom is curtailed ... ." Id The potential
deprivations of guardianship include the loss of the ward's freedom. See notes 77-81 supra.
The reasoning in Gault, therefore, should be emphatically applied to guardianship proceed-
ings.
187. As essential as the representation by counsel is to the protection of a child's rights in
juvenile proceedings, the Court would not force such representation on the child. Rather,
waiver of the right is permitted, provided it reaches the level of the "knowing and intelligent"
waiver required in criminal prosecutions. See Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962); John-
son v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); United States ex rel Brown v. Fay, 242 F. Supp. 273
(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
By analogy, the alleged incompetent should be permitted to waive any mandatorily ap-
pointed counsel. Although there are inherent contradictions in permitting an alleged incompe-
tent to waive this right, the purpose of mandatorily appointing counsel is to accord the right,
not to force its acceptance. In criminal proceedings, in which the interests at stake are no less
significant, the defendant is permitted such a waiver if it is "knowing and intelligent." Al-
though there is serious doubt that an alleged incompetent could effect such a waiver, the stan-
dard should nonetheless apply.
188. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976).
VI. Conclusions
Analysis of Pennsylvania guardianship law indicates that signif-
icant interests of alleged incompetents are threatened by a high risk
of erroneous deprivation. Mandatory appointment of counsel will
significantly reduce the risk of such an erroneous deprivation. While
increased fiscal and administrative burdens and the cost to society of
underprotection of some incompetents must be considered, these in-
terests do not outweigh the need to protect the interests of the alleged
incompetent. Ultimately, because the competence of the proposed
ward is the issue in a guardianship proceeding, due process and fair-
ness demand that the state assume the burden of the decision that
representation of the alleged incompetent's interest is necessary.
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